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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA VAR PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
?•lARRINER l\1. lVIORRISON, 
District Judge, 
Defendant, and Respondent. 
I Plaintiff's I Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An Alternative Writ of Mandate was issued out 
of this court to l\1arriner M. Morrison, District Judge, 
August 10, 1948, directing him to "enter judgment in 
conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court 
in the above entitled cause, in case No. 7056, as 
directed by this court, or that you appear and show 
cause before this court on the 20th day of August~ 
1948." 
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Prior to the issuance of the writ, and after the 
opinion and mandate to enter judgment as directed 
in said case· had been remitted to the court below, 
the plaintiffs in said case, with the leave of Judge 
Morrison, filed a paper entitled "Amendment", a copy 
of which is mar-'ked "Exhibit A" and is attached to 
the affidavit and Petition herein, and' is hereby 
referred to. The plaintiffs also applied for ard the 
court issued, a Restraining Order and Order to Show 
Cause, directed to La Var Peterson and the Curlew 
Irrigation and Reservoir Company, a corporation, 
and its Secretary, enjoining and restraining La Var 
from selling, pledging, transferring or in any manner 
disposing of the 119 shares of stock, which the 
''Amendment" alleged was "appurtenant" to the 
S\V~4 of the NWYt of Section 2, T 14 N, R 8 W, 
S. L. M., and the Irrigation Company was also en-
joined and restrained from transferring the said stock. 
upon its books, until after "final determination of the 
new issues raised by the amended pleadings. 
La Var and the other defendants in said cause 
then filed "Demurrer to Purported Amendment and 
M·otion to Dismiss Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause" and "Morton to Strike Purpoitcd 
Amendment" and also "Motion that Judgment be 
Entered as Ordered by the Supreme Court." 
These motions were all set· for hearing on the 
law and' motion calendar and were duly argued to 
the court on .July 18th. At the conclusion of the 
argument, Judge Morrison said he would take said 
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matter under advisement. He further stated that 
if he granted our Motion that Judgment be Entered 
as Directed by the Supreme Court that would end 
and terminate all these matters. 
On July 28th I received through the l\Ia.il copy 
of the following order: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY 
GOLDEN PETERSON, et, al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ORDER 
JOHN CHARLES PETERSON, et. al. 
Defendants. 
Justice and equity demanding, it is 
ORDERED that defendant's demurrer and 
Motion to dismiss filed in the above en-
titled cause be and the same is hereby over-
ruled and denied, and defendant is given 10 
days notice to answer or otherwise plead. 
July 27, 1948. 
l\1ARRINER M. MORRISON, 
DISTRICT JUDGE. 
Upon receipt of that order I went over and talked 
to Judge 1\forrison in his chambers at Log-an, and 
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asked him what he bad decided to do about our 
Motion that Judgment be Entered as Directed l.>y the 
Supreme Court. He said he thought he would keep 
the motion pending until after the hearing and final 
determination of the case on the amended pleadings. 
I told the Judge that I didn't think he could do 
that, that I didn't think he had jur~sdiction to have 
any further hearing on said matter, or authority to 
try any new issues, and I insisted that he either 
grant or deny our Motion that Judgment be Entered 
as Directed by the Supreme Court. Judge Morrison 
then said, ''If I deny your motion, you will cite me~ 
down to the Suprem2 Court on mandamus proceed-
ings." I said, "I certainly will, Judge. I don't think 
you have any other p~werl or authority, except to 
comply with the mandate of the Supr~me Court and 
enter up judgment as the Suprem~ Court has di-
directed." The Judge said he would think the matter 
over further and decide what to do about our 
motion. 
A few days thereafter I received in the mail 
copy of Order denying our motion that Judgment be 
entered as ordered by the Supreme Court, a copy of 
which Order is set forth in the Affidavit and Petition 
herein, marked ''Exhibit E", which is hereby referred 
to and made a part of tl-tis statement of facts. 
After the time had expired as stated in the 
Alternative Writ, upon inquiry, I was advised by 
the Clerk, Mr. Cummings, of the Answer filed by 
Judge Morrison hPrein. I then took a copy of the 
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Affidavit and Petition to Judge Morrison. He said 
he would mail it to the Attorney General who was 
his attorney in this matter. After that I received 
a letter from the Attorney General's Office enc1os-
ing copy of RespondE'nt's Answer, and stating that 
they had forwarded all pap::rs to Attorrev J. D. 
Skeen. who would handle the matter on behalf of 
Judge 1\Iorrison. 
In his Answer to the Alternative \Yr:t of Man-
date respondent says that "he believes he is justified 
in whatever action is complained of and that he has 
a good and legal defense to said writ." He further 
states that he is not informed of the complaint 
because no copy of the affidavit was served upon 
him. r\ s noted abJve he has now rE'ceived copy of. 
the Affidavit and Petition, which he has sent to his 
attorneys. 
In the original complaint, filed about six years 
ago, the plaintiffs asked that Charles PetetSOJli and 
the other defendants hold four separate tracts of land 
in trust for plaintiffs. In the first amended complaint 
they asked that 1\'Iaria Pet€rson be adjudged to hold 
above described premises in trust for plaintiffs. In 
their second am,ended complaint they asked that the 
deed from Maria Peterson to La Var be adjudged to be 
null and void, alleging that La Var was not a bona 
fide purchaser for value. 
Although the trial court found and held that 
LaVar was a bona fide purcl1aser. for valu~. this court 
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in case No. 7056, (being a case in equity) made its 
own findings, and held that La Var was not a bona 
fide purchaser for value, without notice, and therefore 
found that the prayer of the second amenced com-
plaint should be granted, and judgment should be 
entered that the deed from Maria Peterson to LaVar 
should be held to be null and void, and Maria should 
be adjudged to hold the above described premises in 
trust for p~aintiffs, nad rerranded the case to tl1e 
court below with direction to enter up said judgment. 
In none of the above plead1ngs was any water 
stock ever mentioned or claimed. In the first com~ 
plaint this 40 acres was only incidental. The main 
land they apparently started for was the SE%. of Sec. 
12. Now t<hey want to go back and include water stock 
in an irrigation company as appurtenant to the 40 
acres. If that stock is aprurbnant to that land, why 
did plaintiffs get out an injunctive writ against LaVar 
and the Irrigation Company? 
ARGUMENT 
The one principal question presented to this 
Court therefore is: \Vas the Respondent as District 
Judge, justified in ignoring the mandate of the 
Supreme Court in case No. 7056 in which this court 
ordered: "The Judgment is reversed with directions 
to the trial court to enter judgment in conformity 
with this opinion." 
We submit there is no m3rit in Respondent's 
prayer that the Alternative \Vrit be recalled. Re· 
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spondent knew and was well versed in all of the facts. 
The 1\Iotion to Enter Up Judgment as Ordered by the 
Supreme Court was argued before Judge Morrison 
on two different occasions. The statute does not 
require any notice to the adverse party before the 
alternative writ is issued. Section 104-68-5, U.C.A. 
1943. 
\Ve think the law is well settled that Respondent 
in case at bar had no jurisdiction or authority to 
do any other act than that which the court ordered. 
5 C.J.S. pg 1514, No. 1967,-Generallyi the 
lower court has no power, after a cause has been 
determined on appeal, to vacate or modify the 
judgment of the app2llate court, or its own judg-
ment after affirmance. 
5 C.J.S. pg 1521, Amendments, After Final 
Judgment Rendered or Directed. 
Ordinarily the trial court has no power to 
allow 't~1e amendment of plead~ngs after final 
judgment has been rendered or directed on 
appeal. 
30 ALR 1414, general rule that, when merits 
of a case are determined on appeal, trial court has 
no power but to obey judgment of the appellate 
court. 
Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, Vol. 
9. page 9769, No. 7429, Proceedings in Lower 
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Court Generally - Construction of Mandate. lt 
is the duty of the lower court, when a case is 
remanded, to comply with the mandate of the 
avvt!llate court, even though there is error there-
in. Public interests require that an end shall be 
put to litigation and if a lower court were author-
ized to disobey the mandate, litigation would 
never be ended, and the supreme tribunal of the 
state would be shorn of that authority over 
inferior tribunals with which it is invested 
by fundamental law. A trial .court has no jur-
isdiction except to proceed in accordance with 
the mandate or remittitur, and any pr,oceedings 
contrary thereto must be treated as null and 
void. So where a mandate directs the entry 
of a particular judgment, it is the duty of the 
trial court to proceed as directed. 
Same source, No. 7430: Am2ndments and 
Additional Pleadings. 
* * * According to the weight of author-
ity, a trial court may not permit the filing of 
amended or supplemental pleadings or allow 
new issues to be framed to try rights already 
settled, where a cause is reversed and remanded 
with directions to enter. a particular judg-
ment~ * * * 
Galbreath v. Vi/' all rich, 139 Am. St. Rep. 263, 
(Colo.) : Amendment of the pleadings disal-
lowed after the Supreme Court had reversed the 
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lower court and ordered judgment in favor of · 
plaintiffs. 
Fork, etc., v. Tool Co., 160 U. S. 2-17, quot-
ing with approval \Yadhams v. Gay, 83 Ill. 250: 
On receipt of the mandate and opinion the trial 
court was bound to carry into C:)mplete effect 
the decision of this court, not to retry the cause 
or place the parties in a position by which the 
cause might be retried. In what a lamentable 
condition would suitors be if the opinions and 
final orders of this court are to be disregarded 
by an inferior court. One of the great interests 
of the public is that an end shall b€ put to 
litigation. The opinion of this court was on 
merits. The mandate required the trial court 
to enter judgment in conformity with the 
opinion of this court, - not a retrial of the 
case, or the entry of any order which might 
have that effect. The authorities are clear on 
this point. Skillers Ex'rs v. Mays Ex'rs, 3 L. 
Ed. 220, decided by the Supnme Court of the 
U S .. as early as 1810, is directly on this ques-
tion and subsequnet cases harmonize with it. 
Gloser v. Wonnelley, 193 P. 76 (N.l\i.). It 
is well settled that it is the duty of the lower 
court on remand of a cause to comply with the 
mandate of the appellate court and to obey the 
directions therein without variation, even though 
the mandate may be, or· is. supposed to be 
erroneous. 4 C .. J. pg. 1221. 
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Lumber Co. v. Swartwont, 197 P. 1027, 
(Idaho), Where tL.e appellate court remands the 
cause with direction to enter judgment for one 
of the parties, the judgm~nt of the appellate 
court is the final judgment in the cause, and the 
·entry thereof in the lower court is a purely 
ministerial act. 2 RCL 389, (citing many cases) 
and 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 715. 
3 Am. J ur. page 729 : H. Proceedings in 
trial court after remand. No. 1233. Generally. 
As pointed out above, the jurisdiction( of the 
court below, which was lost by the court suing 
out of write of error or by th.e appeal, is re-
acquired when the mandate is filed with it. 
Further proceedings in the trial court necessary 
to carry out the mandate are then had. These 
however, must be in accord with the mandate, 
and the trial court must therefore asc2rtain 
the meaning of the mandate and determine what 
was decided by the reviewing court in order that 
it may know what disposition to make of the 
case. When the mandate orders a specific judg--
ment to be entered, no difficulty· or question of 
construction arises, for there is nothing; for the 
court to do but to enter the judrm~nt di-
rected .. 
No. 1234 .Duty to Comply with Mandate. 
After a case has been determined by the re-
viewing court and remanded to the trial court, 
the duty of the latter is to comply with the 
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mandate of the former. The mandat('J of the 
reviewing court is binding on the lower court 
and must be strictly followed and carried into 
effect according to its true intent and meaning, 
as determined by the directions given by sucn 
reviewing court. Public interest requires that 
litigation shall come to an end spzedily, so that 
when a cause has been tried to judgment, and 
the merits of a trial determined upon appeal, 
the trial court upon remittitur, has no power 
but to obey the judgment of the appe:Iate 
court. , It may, by various methods, be com-
pelled to comply with that mandate; and if it 
misconstrues the direction of the reviewing court, 
does not give full effect to its mandate, or ent-:-.rs 
a judgment ·or decree which is not in conform-
ity thereto, a new review is appropriate. Pro-
ceedings contrary . to the mandate must be 
treated · as null and void. 
No. 1236. Judgment in Conformity to Man-
date. The lower court, upon remand of a case 
from a higher court, must obey the mandate or 
remittitur; and render judgment in conformity 
thereto; . it has no authority to enter any judg-
ment not in conformity with the order, or any 
judgment other than directed or permitted by 
the reviewing court. Otherwise, litigation 
would never be ended, and the supreme tribunal 
of the state would be shorn of authority over 
inferior tribunals. This is particularly true 
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when the mandate or remittitur orders the entry 
·Of a specific judgment or a particular decree. 
When the merits of a case are determined on 
appeal, the trial court has no power but to obey 
the judgment of the appellate court ... Where 
the appellate court remands a cause with di-
rections to enter judgment for the plaintiff in 
a certain amount, the judgment of the appellate 
court is a final judgment in the cause and the 
entry thereof in the lower court is a purely 
ministerial act. No modification of the j udg-
ment so directed can be made, nor may any 
provision be engrafted on, or taken from, it. 
That order is conclusive on the parties, and no 
judgment or ·order different from, or in addi-
tion to, that directed bv it can have any effect, 
even though it may be such as the appellate 
court ought to have directed. 
No. 1237. Alteration, 1\tlodification, Amend-
ment, etc., by Trial Court of Mandate. After 
the reviewing court has determined a case be-
fore it and remanded such case to the lower 
court, the latter is without power to modify, 
alter, amend, set aside, or in any manner dis-
tur or depart from the judgment of the 
reviewing court, even during the continuance 
of the term in which it was rendered. The 
judgment of the higher court is not reviewable 
in any way by the court below, in the exercise 
of its equitable powers, or otherwise. The 
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lower CJurt cannot vary or examine the d~cree 
of the higher court for any other purpose than 
execution; give any other or further relief; 
review it, even for apparent error, upon any 
matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with 
it, further than to settle so much as has been 
remanded. It can only proceed to execute the 
mandate and settle so much as re·mains to be 
done, without rescission or modification. 
If the lower courts were autlJ.or:zed to dis-
ob2y the mandate, litigation would never be 
ended and the supreme tribunal of the state 
would be shorn of that authority over the in-
ferior tribunal with which it is invested. But 
the rule has long prevailed that there must be 
an end to the litigation of a particular cause, 
and that an alleged injured litigant, in order to 
establish what he may deem the justice of the 
cause, may not have, de novo, trial afV.:1r trial, 
ad infinitum. The principle that a lower court 
has no power to ::liter or amend a judgment 
after it has be~n· affrmed by a reviewing- court 
and remanded to the lowPr court is applicable 
to criminal, as well as to civil, cases . 
No. 1232. 3 Am. Jur. page 72'8.: Compell-
ing Obedience to Mandate. When the trial court 
fails or refuses to obey or give effect to the 
mandate or remittitur of the reviewing court, 
misconstrues it, or acts beyond its province in 
carrying it out, it becomes the province and 
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duty of the appellate court to enforce compliance 
therewith. The remedy generally recognized as 
the proper one is a writ or order of m~ndamus, 
but this is not the only remedy; a new app:;al 
may be had, and on such second appeal the 
court may, instead of remanding the case again, 
itself proceed to final judgment. In some jur-
isdictions, compliance with the mandate may 
also be enforced by contempt proceedings and 
by a writ of prohibition. Such remedies may 
be defeated by delay in making application to 
c.ompel obedience to the mandate. 
In conclusion we respectfully submit tnat any 
claim or allegation about the water stock, or . that 
said stock. is "appurtenant" to the described pre~ises 
raises new issues of fact not heretofore raised or 
claimed, which are now precluded as resjudicata. To 
settle those issues would require a ne·w trial. Tne 
plaintiff's fixed the bounds and purpose of their action 
in their pleading. Neither in their original complaint, 
nor in their first supplerr:ental eomplaint, nor in their 
second supplemental complaint did they mention or 
make any claim to any water stock, but claimed only 
the land. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
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